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National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian:
Supreme Court Upholds NCAA's Private Status
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Repelling
Shark's Attack on NCAA's
Disciplinary Powers*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Collegiate Athletics Overshadows Academics
The lure of lucrative rewards' and the burden of escalating ex-
penditures2 for colleges and universities in athletic events sponsored
by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)3 are con-
* Jerry Tarkanian, nicknamed "the Shark," has been the focus of NCAA
sanctions while coaching basketball at the California State University at Long Beach
(CSULB) and the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV). For further information
about Tarkanian's background, see infra notes 166-67.
1. "The 52 schools in the NCAA basketball tournament [in 1983] were each guar-
anteed $120,000, with $290,000 guaranteed to each of the final 16 teams and $520,000 to
each in the final four." Comment, NCAA Eligibility Regulations and the Fourteenth
Amendment-Where Is the State Action?, 13 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 433, 435 (1986). By
1988, the basketball tournament had gross receipts totaling $68.2 million with the final
four teams each receiving $1.2 million. Gup, Foul!, TIME, Apr. 3, 1989, at 55. Further-
more, NCAA basketball has also fared well in light of its recent $166 million contract
with Columbia Broadcasting System for the television rights for three years of Divi-
sion I basketball. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Penalty:
How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 985 (1987) (citing
NCAA News, Jan. 14, 1987, at 2, col 4). Furthermore, more than 25 million people
watched the 1988-89 NCAA basketball tournament. Gup, supra, at 54.
During 1983, $35 million was divided between the schools participating in 16 bowl
games for Division I college football. Comment, supra, at 435. In a 1986 survey of reve-
nues of football programs at NCAA institutions, aggregate revenues were an estimated
$1,064,749,000, representing a 48% increase from 1982. Smith, supra, at 985 (citing
NCAA News, Nov. 3, 1986, at 14, col. 1). Furthermore, "the average income for football
at Division I member institutions had reached $3.4 million in 1984, with some pro-
grams generating in excess of $10 million in gross income." Id. (citing Christian Sci.
Monitor, June 25, 1985, at 20, col. 1).
2. "[D]ivision I schools with football programs spent an average of $3.24 million
on men's athletics in 1981." Comment, supra note 1, at 435. Furthermore, aggregate
expenses for Division I football programs were estimated at $1.2 billion. Smith, supra
note 1, at 985 (citing NCAA News, Nov. 3, 1986, at 14, col. 1).
3. The NCAA sponsors 77 national championships composed of 41 events for the
men's competition, 34 events for the women's competition, and two events which are
for both sexes. Martin, The NCAA and Its Student-Athletes: Is There Still State Ac-
tion?, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 49, 55 (1985-86) (citing NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
stantly in conflict with the primary educational and academic pur-
poses of such institutions and the NCAA.4 Often the pursuit of
athletic excellence, by both the school and the individual,5 takes pri-
ority over providing the student-athlete with a diploma.6 Conse-
quently, the NCAA and its member institutions have been criticized
by members of Congress, 7 university faculty,8 the media, 9 legal schol-
Ass'N, 1985-86 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIc Ass'N MANUAL, Exec. Reg. § 3(a), at
172 (1985)).
4. "One of the NCAA's fundamental policies is to maintain intercollegiate athlet-
ics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of
the student body, and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between college
athletics and professional sports." National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109
S. Ct. 454, 457 (1988). See also Smith, supra note 1, at 986 (citing NATIONAL COL-
LEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N CONST. art. II, § 2(a), reprinted in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC Ass'N, 1986-87 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N 7
(1986)).
5. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
6. "[A] commitment to recruit, train, cultivate, and promote a team capable of
multimillion dollar revenues may be inconsistent with the simultaneous commitment
to provide a quality university education." Comment, supra note 1, at 446.
"[B]eneath the pageantry of ... [the NCAA basketball tournament] lies another,
more disturbing kind of madness: an obsession with winning and moneymaking that is
perverting the noblest ideals of both sports and education in America." Gup, supra
note 1, at 54.
7. See Oversight on College Athletic Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Education, Arts, and Humanities of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings]. Senator Howard Metzen-
baum commented on the plight of today's intercollegiate athletics, by saying, "schools
are not interested in whether Johnny can read, but whether Johnny can run, pass, and
kick." Id. at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum).
Representative Thomas Luken of Ohio echoed the comments of Senator Metzen-
baum, by stating:
[t]he unhappy fact is that the NCAA is not primarily concerned about kids
who pass through its sports factories. Athletics departments are expected to
be financially self-sustaining, so the profit motive supercedes any concern for
the intellectual development of the athletes. This breeds a corrupting and de-
structive drive to win, regardless of the emotional, spiritual or educational
cost to the student. The hope of meaningful reform within the NCAA is
chimera.
Smith, supra note 1, at 985 (citing NCAA News, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2, col. 2) (citing N.Y.
Times, Oct. 4, 1986, at 23, col. 1).
8. Dr. Harry Edwards, a sociology professor at the University of California at Los
Angeles, condemned the institutional emphasis on intercollegiate athletics by telling
Congress, "'dumb jocks' are not born; they are being systematically created and insti-
tutionally accommodated." Hearings, supra note 7, at 49-102.
9. Another commentator noted an additional problem:
[F]or many [student-athletes] the promise of an education was a sham. They
were betrayed by the good intentions of others, by institutional self-interest
and by their own blind love of the game. Equally victimized are the colleges
and universities that participate in educational travesty-a farce that devalues
every degree and denigrates the mission of higher education.
Gup, supra note 1, at 55; see, e.g., L.A. Times, Dec. 14, 1988, § III, at 1, col. 3 ("NCAA
... is world class in pompousness, arrogance, and highhandedness").
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ars,' 0 college coaches,' and even the NCAA itself' 2 for emphasizing
athletics over academics.
The overemphasis on a successful athletic program arises not only
from the member institutions of the NCAA,13 but also from the indi-
vidual student-athlete, who is using collegiate athletics as a stepping-
stone to a professional career 14 by accentuating his skills on the court
instead of in the classroom.' 5 This situation is intensified when stu-
10. One commentator noted the possible advantage of focusing on athletics over
academics:
[N]ot only is the athlete often exchanging his prowess for an education, 'the
chance to display... athletic prowess in college stadiums and arenas through-
out the country [may be] worth more in economic terms than the chance to
get a college education.' (citation omitted) Even if the college athlete does not
reach the professional ranks, our sports-dominated culture often rewards out-
standing college athletes in both tangible and intangible ways. Viewed from
several different perspectives, the interests of athletes cannot be lightly disre-
garded. Moreover these are interests that are not formally represented in the
NCAA process, or by member institutions.
Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 101, 137 (1984) (discussing how pressure of major college athletics caused
NCAA to pass the controversial Proposition 48, requiring incoming freshmen to have
minimum SAT or ACT scores and grade point averages to be eligible for athletic
competition).
11. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 1988, § III, at 1, col. 4. (Larry Brown, a former
college basketball coach speaks critically of the NCAA's procedures).
12. See Benenson, Changing Environment in College Sports, 1 CONG. Q., Apr. 15,
1983, at 275 (quoting Mr. David Berst, the NCAA's Director of Enforcement as saying,
"if a coach's job depends on winning, the temptation is tremendous to do anything to
get the talent"). Furthermore, Berst has suggested "that as many as 15% of all NCAA
schools are involved in illegal activity at any given time." Comment, supra note 1, at
435. Walter Byers, the former Executive Director of the NCAA, conceded that it is no
longer viable to assert the goal of amateurism at all levels of intercollegiate athletic
competition. Smith, supra note 1, at 986.
13. See supra notes 1-2.
14. "[Plarticipation in the NCAA championships in such men's sports as [football],
basketball, ice hockey, and baseball brings with it not simply prestige, but exposure to
major league scouts, and is thus of significant value to the student-athlete aspiring to a
professional career in his sport." Martin, supra note 3, at 55.
15. In a recent college basketball eligibility case, U.S. District Court Judge Miles
Lord lamented this undue emphasis on sports over academics:
The private interest at stake here, although ostensibly academic, is the plain-
tiff's ability to obtain a 'no cut' contract with the National Basketball Associa-
tion. The bachelor of arts, while a mark of achievement and distinction does
not, in and of itself, assure the applicant a means of earning a living. This ap-
plicant seems to recognize this and has opted to use his college career as a
means of entry into professional sports as do many college athletes. His bas-
ketball career will be little affected by the absence or presence of a bachelor
of arts degree. This plaintiff has put all of his 'eggs' into the 'basket' of pro-
fessional basketball. The plaintiff would suffer a substantial loss if his career
objectives were impaired.
Martin, supra note 3, at 55-56 (quoting Hall v. University of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104,
108 (D. Minn. 1982)). Two former football players admitted to taking "such puff
dents from lower socioeconomic backgrounds focus on athletics,
rather than academics, in order to escape a depressed environment.16
Moreover, emphasis on athletic prowess often begins in elementary
and secondary schools which, not surprisingly, also receive greater
athletic funding, thereby fostering athletics over academics. 17 Statis-
tics also reveal the narrow probability of a professional career' 8 as
well as the strain that a student-athlete confronts when attempting
to achieve professional status. 19 Consequently, many student-ath-
letes find that their athletic careers end simultaneously with their ac-
ademic endeavors, resulting in the nonexistence of a professional
contract and the lack of a college diploma.
B. Efforts of the NCAA to Restore Academic Integrity
Although the commercialization of amateur athletics is certainly
not novel to the NCAA,20 the Association has adopted recent amend-
courses as billiards, watercolor painting and recreational leisure." Gup, supra note 1,
at 55.
16. See Comment, supra note 1, at 445.
17. I& "From the time athletes are first recognized as having athletic ability they
are set apart from their peers and encouraged to concentrate on developing that ath-
letic talent." Id.
18. "Only about 5% of high school athletes are able to play college basketball,
baseball, or football, of those eligible to enter professional sports at the end of their
career, only about 1.7% do so, and of those few who do make the pros, more than 60%
are back on the street in three years. I&r at 445 (citing N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1984, at 17,
col. 4).
The chances of playing in the National Basketball Association are "less than 1 in
500." Gup, supra note 1, at 55. "The odds of becoming a brain surgeon are greater than
the odds of winning a starting spot on the Boston Celtics." Id. (quoting John Slaugh-
ter, president of Occidental College).
19. It is estimated that Division I basketball requires 35-40 hours per week for
practice, training, preparation, and games; Division I football requires 45-49 hours. The
addition of travel time increases these figures to 50 and 60 hours respectively. Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 93. Student basketball players miss 30 to 40 days of classes be-
cause of road games. Gup, Playing To Win in Vegas, TIME, Apr. 3, 1989, at 57. Thus,
"[e]ven the most motivated students would have trouble keeping up academically
while practicing ... 30 hours a week." Cup, supra note 1, at 55.
For example, Carl Hayes, a member of the University of Nebraska basketball team,
has his textbooks tape-recorded, has a notetaker occasionally accompany him to class,
and is given additional time to complete his exams, which are read to him because he
has a reading disability. I&r at 57-58.
20. In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Education com-
pleted a three-year study on the effect of athletics on academics and made the follow-
ing finding:
[A] change of values is needed in a field that is sodden with the commercial
and the material and the vested interests that these forces have created. Com-
mercialism in college athletics must be diminished and college sport must rise
to a point where it is esteemed primarily and sincerely for the opportunities it
affords to mature youth ... to exercise at once the body and the mind and to
foster habits [of] both bodily health and.., high qualities of character ....
Smith, supra note 1, at 991 (citing GEORGE MASON UNIV. & THE AMERICAN COUNCIL
ON EDUC., ADMIN. OF UNIV. PROGRAMS: INTERNAL CONTROL AND EXCELLENCE 18, 22
(1986)). Moreover, the NCAA was in existence at the time the Carnegie study was
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ments to its bylaws21 to curb the assault on academic integrity, and
has stepped up enforcement of its rules, resulting in increased disci-
pline of its members. Furthermore, in 1984, the NCAA formed the
President's Commission, consisting of chief executive officers of
NCAA institutions, to address policy and reform considerations con-
fronting intercollegiate athletics. 22 By 1985, the Commission had pro-
posed a plan aimed at restoring integrity to the intercollegiate
system, 23 including the "death penalty,"24 whereby repeat offenders
of NCAA rules could be suspended from athletic competition for as
long as two years.25 Already, the NCAA has used the death penalty
in a highly publicized two-year suspension of the once-successful
Southern Methodist University football team.26 Such notoriety may
ultimately deter other member institutions from circumventing the
NCAA's rules.
Nevertheless, the recent effort by the NCAA to clean up college
athletics has been hindered by various judicial challenges2 7 to the
NCAA's authority by the institutions or the athletes which fall under
NCAA scrutiny. Most cases have alleged that NCAA sanctions de-
conducted as the NCAA began its reign in 1910. See infra notes 44-45 and accompany-
ing text.
21. See infra notes 56, 92 and accompanying text.
22. See Smith, supra note 1, at 986-87 (footnote omitted). "The President's Com-
mission consistently emphasizes its commitment to ensuring the 'integrity' of amateur
athletics at the intercollegiate level." Id. at 987 (citing NCAA News, Sept. 22, 1985, at
4, col. 1).
23. Id.
24. The "'death penalty' was designed to bolster the NCAA's enforcement capa-
bility. As such, it is intended to operate as a significant disincentive to cheating by the
personnel of member institutions in recruiting and other activities designed to enhance
and render more profitable the disobedient institution's program." Id.
25. Id. Furthermore, a Division I subcommittee advocated that:
'a penalty be added to the minimum package of penalties in major violations
to specify that all institutional staff members who were found to have en-
gaged in or condoned a major violation would be subject to termination, sus-
pension without pay for at least one year, or reassignment to institutional
duties that do not involve contact with any prospective or enrolled student-
athletes or any representatives of athletics interests for at least one year.'
Id. at 1002 & n.99 (footnote omitted) (quoting 1984-85 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE NAT'L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N 230 (1986)) (emphasis added).
The committee "favored procedures that would require suspension or dismissal of
coaches found guilty of major or repeated violations ...." Id. Furthermore, amend-
ments to bylaws would "require that any restrictions imposed upon an institution's
coaching staff member by the Committee on Infraction or as a result of the Associa-
tion's 'show cause' provisions must be applied to the coach even if the individual is em-
ployed at some other institution." I&r at 1003 (footnote omitted).
26. See McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.
1988).
27. See infra notes 75-76, 144 and accompanying text.
prive schools or their athletes of procedural due process,28 or that
NCAA rules are violative of substantive due process 29 or equal pro-
tection rights. 30 However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian,31 upholding the
NCAA's status as a private actor under the fourteenth amendment,
should pave the way toward increasing the NCAA's control over its
members and decreasing the number of judicial challenges to its
authority.
C. Scope of Note
In Section II of this note, a brief historical background will be
given on the establishment and growth of the NCAA.32 Considera-
tion will be given to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment,
which most often provide the avenue for attacking NCAA author-
ity.33 Furthermore, Section II will analyze prior decisions reached by
various federal and state courts, which have been divided on the
NCAA's status as a state or private actor.34
Next, Section III will discuss the factual setting surrounding
Tarkanian, which began in the early 1970's and has yet to be fully
resolved.35 This section also will discuss the procedural background
during this time span, 36 wherein Tarkanian won all of his battles in
the Nevada state courts.
Section IV37 will analyze Justice Stevens' majority opinion, which
upholds the NCAA's status as a private actor under the fourteenth
amendment 38 and section 198339 of Title 42 of the United States
Code. This section also will discuss Justice White's dissenting opin-
ion, joined by three other Justices, which argues that the NCAA is a
state actor.
Section V will discuss the practical impact of Tarkanian. In addi-
tion, this section will address the concern that the NCAA has become
too powerful in administering its disciplinary procedures over state-
28. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
29. See, e.g., Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th
Cir. 1977).
30. See, e.g., Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1975).
31. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
32. See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
34. See inkfra notes 75-160 and accompanying text; see also cases cited infra notes
75-76, 144.
35. See Infra notes 162-94 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 196-225 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 226-54 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 60 for text of fourteenth amendment.
39. See infra note 58 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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funded universities. Finally, this note will conclude that although
the NCAA finally won the eleven-year battle against the UNLV
coach in the Supreme Court, Tarkanian stayed off his suspension
long enough to claim a simultaneous victory in his battle against the
NCAA.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The NCAA's Roots and Development40
The development of intercollegiate athletics began in the mid-nine-
teenth century and with it grew the concern of faculty members for
controlling the educational demands resulting from athletics.41 Nev-
ertheless, "[t]he commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, includ-
ing the payment of compensation to the best athletes, was well
entrenched by the latter part of the nineteenth century."4 2 Subse-
quently, the actions of President Theodore Roosevelt, who invited of-
ficials from selected major football programs to review football
rules,43 ultimately led to the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States,44 which was renamed the National
Collegiate Athletic Association in 1910.45
Although the NCAA had little influence during its infancy,46 it be-
gan to exercise some control as a sponsor of national champion-
40. For an authorized history of the NCAA, published by the NCAA to celebrate
its 75th anniversary, see J. FALLA, NCAA: THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS (1981).
41. Smith, supra note 1, at 989.
42. Id. at 989 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the reforms of yesteryear faced
hurdles similar to today's attempts at reform:
[B]y the. latter part of the nineteenth century, when initial efforts to control
the excesses of intercollegiate athletics first were promulgated, the very ten-
sions facing reform efforts in intercollegiate athletics today-commercializa-
tion, institutional pride and vacillation among faculty and administration
relating to the purposes of intercollegiate athletics--constituted significant im-
pediments to those early reform efforts.
Id at 990.
43. Sadly, this was in response to 18 deaths and over 100 injuries in intercollegiate
football in 1905. Id.
44. The original membership consisted of 62 institutions. Id. at 991.
45. Id. (footnote omitted).
46. Initially, the NCAA was formed solely to formulate rules for various sports.
However, it also was organized to eliminate "unsavory violence" and "preserve ama-
teurism." Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J.
9, 12 (1985).
ships, 47 by revitalizing its rules to maintain academic integrity.48
Intercollegiate athletics expanded tremendously after World War II,
aided by the advent of television as a new medium,49 which caused
the NCAA to exercise greater control over its expanding member-
ship.50 Consequently, "with financial support provided by its share of
the television contracts and with its unceasingly forceful role in in-
fractions matters, the NCAA [has come] to play a dominant role in
the current governance of intercollegiate athletics."51
Today, the NCAA is made up of nearly one thousand members
consisting of four-year colleges and universities located throughout
the United States-half of which are public institutions-52 -and the
institutions' affiliated conferences and associations.53 The NCAA de-
scribes itself as a "voluntary nonprofit educational organization,"5 4
whose members "pay annual dues to the NCAA and adopt, in annual
convention, various rules regulating athletic competition among the
members, including the eligibility of students to compete in intercol-
legiate athletics."55 However, the NCAA's effort to regulate intercol-
47. The NCAA sponsored its first championship event in 1921 and, within 20
years, was sponsoring championships in 10 different sports. Smith, supra note 1, at 991
n.30 (citing G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW 2 (1986)).
48. "During this period, coaches and administrators also began to take a major
role in operating and recruiting for their intercollegiate athletic programs. [Also,]
[t]hefederal government under the New Deal took an active role in promoting athlet-
ics." Id. at 992 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
49. The NCAA negotiated its first television contract for college football for over
$1 million. Id. at 993 (citing G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH:& J. TRENTADUE, supra note 47, at
2).
50. Between 1950 and 1970 the membership increased 128%. By 1973, the NCAA
had approximately 664 members; by 1983, membership had increased 146% to 971
members. Martin, supra note 3, at 55 (footnotes omitted).
51. Smith, supra note 1, at 993. The NCAA's control was augmented by a new set
of enforcement procedures in 1951 and the creation of the Committee on Infractions,
an enforcement body given additional authority to penalize members involved in rules
violations. Gaona, The National Collegiate Athletic Association: Fundamental Fairness
and the Enforcement Problem, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1981). Furthermore, the
NCAA became powerful under the direction of Walter Byers, as Executive Director of
the NCAA, who helped establish the NCAA's enforcement division, which aids the
Committee on Infractions in the enforcement process. McCallum, In the Kingdom of
the Solitary Man, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 6, 1986, at 70.
52. See cases cited in(fra note 119; see also Martin, supra note 3, at 55 (footnote
omitted).
53. Martin, supra note 3, at 54 (citing Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1020 (6th Cir. 1984)).
54. Id. (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 55 (footnote omitted).
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legiate athletics 56 has been the source of much criticism,57 as well as
the focus of several actions involving section 1983.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Vis-a-Vis 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 198358 originated as section one of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act,59 which was enacted three years after the adoption of the four-
teenth amendment.60 Enacted during the Reconstruction era, section
1983 was aimed at correcting the social and political impediments
confronting blacks at that time,61 as well as curbing the unlawful
practices of the Ku Klux Klan, who sought to further oppress the
rights of the emancipated slaves.62
Originally, the scope of section 1983 was limited to the preservation
56. In 1986, the NCAA passed an amendment to bylaw 5-1-(j) which requires in-
coming freshmen to graduate high school with a 2.0 grade point average in a core cur-
riculum of at least 11 academic full-year courses, and receive a combined score of 700
on the SAT or 15 on the ACT. Comment, supra note 1, at 433.
Furthermore, bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3), which became effective in 1980, provides in perti-
nent part:
Any participation by a student as an individual or as a representative of any
team in organized competition in a sport during each 12-month period after
the student's 20th birthday and prior to matriculation at a member institution
shall count as one year of varsity competition in that sport.
Martin, supra note 3, at 51 (footnote omitted) (quoting 1982-83 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS'N MANUAL 72 (1982).
57. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
58. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Id.
59. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
60. The fourteenth amendment reads, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61. See Note, Constitutional Law: Section 1983 and Due Process Liberties-Kelson
v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985), 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 129 (1986); see
also Martin, supra note 3, at 71.
62. See Note, supra note 61, at 131.
of voting rights.63 Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court
expanded the coverage of section 198364 so that a variety of constitu-
tional claims, 65 alleging violations under color of state law, may be
brought before a federal court.66 As a result, for the past twenty-five
years a dramatic increase in the use of section 1983 has occurred. In
fact, it comprises eleven percent of all federal district court civil
cases. 67 Part of this increase may be attributed to a section 1983
plaintiff filing in state court, whereupon the defendant removes the
case to federal jurisdiction.68 Consequently, courts hearing a section
63. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S.
368 (1915).
64. In McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), the Supreme Court articu-
lated four main purposes of § 1983: (1) the ability "to override certain kinds of state
laws"; (2) "to provide a remedy where a state law was inadequate"; (3) "to provide a
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available
in practice"; and (4) "to provide a remedy in federal courts supplementary to any rem-
edy any State may have." Id. at 672 (citations omitted).
65. In order to bring an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must initially establish two
elements: (1) the alleged conduct must have been committed by a person acting under
color of state law, and (2) the alleged conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States." Note, supra note 61, at 132 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981),
rev'd in part sub nom. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)).
66. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162 (1970) (to act under
color of state law, an individual must act with knowledge of and pursuant to the stat-
ute); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (Court held that police officers
who fatally beat a black man after arrest were acting under "color of state law" as
under color of law meant under pretense of law); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941) ("under color of state low" interpreted to mean "[m]isuse of power, pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law"); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 517
(1939) (Court upheld an injunction restraining various city officials from interfering
with the plaintiffs' right to discuss the National Labor Relations Act); Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1976) (Court held that "neither general
government involvement nor even extensive detailed state regulation is sufficient for a
finding of state action. Rather, the state must affirmatively support and be directly
involved in the specific conduct which is being challenged."); Parker v. Graves, 479
F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1973) (Court held that "[ain action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does
not lie against a private person in his individual capacity. It is only where the person
acts to deprive another of his federal rights under color of state law that § 1983 pro-
vides authority for a federal claim."); see also Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v.
Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965).
67. See Martin, supra note 3, at 72 (citing Baumann, Civil Rights Litigation: Sec-
tion 1983, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 204 n.9 (1985)); see also Blackman,
Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1985).
68. Because § 1983 claims create a federal question, the U.S. District Courts have
original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982), which states in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action author-
ized by law to be commenced by any person...
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person ....
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity se-
cured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
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1983 claim possibly will be less inclined to find "state action" in order
to ease the burden on the court system.
Commentary has developed on the relationship between the four-
teenth amendment and section 1983, as well as the difference, if any,
between the requirements of "state action"69 and "under color of
state law." 70 Because section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment
clearly address the same fundamental rights, the two acts of legisla-
tion effectively mirror each other.71 Nonetheless, the distinction be-
tween "state action" and "under color of state law" has been the
subject of judicial debate. However, the Supreme Court resolved the
debate in United States v. Price,72 holding that "under color of state
law" is equivalent to "state action." 73 Thus, if an action is deemed to
be "state action," then it will satisfy the "under color of state law"
requirement.74
C. Judicial Findings of State Action
1. NCAA as a State Actor
During the mid-1970's, a line of federal appellate75 and district
court 76 cases held that the NCAA was a state actor for purposes of
section 1983. Although the holdings in these cases have been under-
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States ....
Id.
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also supra note 60.
70. See supra notes 65-66.
71. "Because of the close relationship between section 1983 and the fourteenth
amendment, [the latter] is, in effect, incorporated into section 1983 in a manner analo-
gous to the incorporation of various provisions of the Bill of Rights through the four-
teenth amendment itself." Nahmod, Due Process, State Remedies, and Section 1983, 34
U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 218 (1985) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961)).
Moreover, the original title of Section 1983 was "An Act to enforce the Provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other
purposes." Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871).
72. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
73. Id. at 794 n.7; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-39 (1982).
74. But see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (Court held that
claim arising "under color of law" will not always give rise to "state action").
75. See Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir.
1977); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 560 F.2d 352
(8th Cir. 1977); Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975);
Associated Students, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.
1974).
76. See Colorado Seminary v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 417 F. Supp. 852
(D. Colo. 1976); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1975); Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
cut by the Supreme Court's decision in Tarkanian, the cases contain
persuasive arguments 77 for upholding the. NCAA's status as a state
actor. The two leading cases holding that the NCAA was a state ac-
tor are Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Association78 and How-
ard University v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.79
In Parish, basketball players from Centenary, an NCAA member,
challenged the constitutionality of the NCAA's 1.6 minimum grade
point average requirement80 for freshman players arguing that it vio-
lated their equal protection and due process rights.81 The action
arose after the NCAA placed Centenary on indefinite probation be-
cause it declared members of its basketball team eligible, despite
noncompliance with the 1.6 minimum grade point average rule.82
The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the NCAA
from enforcing the sanctions.83
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit held that the NCAA was a state ac-
tor based on two premises. First, the court reasoned that state-sup-
ported institutions play a substantial role in the NCAA,84 and thus
"state participation in or support of nominally private activity is a
well recognized basis for finding state action."8 5 Second, the court
reasoned that the NCAA performed a traditional government func-
tion by regulating intercollegiate athletics8 6 because "organized ath-
letics play a large role in higher education,"87 which is a traditional
government function. The court found state action to avoid the
anomalous situation in which states could elude constitutional scru-
tiny by collectively forming a private association such as the NCAA,
77. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
78. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
79. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
80. "This rule required that NCAA-affiliated schools grant athletic scholarships,
first year eligibility for participation in athletics, and other benefits only to applicants
who could 'predict'-on the basis of their high school grade point average or class rank
and their grade on one of two standardized achievement tests-a minimum 1.6 grade
point average during their first year of college." Parish, 506 F.2d at 1030 (footnote
omitted). This rule was changed in 1973 to require an entering college freshman to
have earned an overall 2.00 grade point average in high school. Id. n.1.
81. Id. at 1033-34. Although the court found that the NCAA was a state actor
under § 1983, it upheld the 1.6 grade point average requirement against the plaintiffs'
constitutional attack. Id.
82. Id. at 1030-31 n.3.
83. Id. at 1031.
84. Id at 1032.
85. Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Smith v.
Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972)).
86. "[M]eaningful regulation of this aspect of education is now beyond the effec-
tive reach of any one state." Id.
87. Id. For examples of state action resulting from performing a traditional gov-
ernment function, see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (running a municipal
park); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (registering to vote in elections); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (operating a company-owned town).
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thereby relinquishing government power. Consequently, if the
NCAA were nonexistent, the government would have to regulate col-
lege athletics.8 8
Moreover, the decision in Parish was followed three months later
by Howard, in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that the NCAA was a state actor under section 1983.89 In
Howard, the university and one of its soccer players sought injunctive
and declaratory relief to prevent the NCAA from imposing sanctions
on the university for violating the NCAA's foreign-student rule,90 the
five-year rule,9 1 and the 1.6 grade point average rule.92
The Howard court held that because approximately one-half of the
NCAA members are state or federally supported,9 3 a substantial and
pervasive entanglement existed between the NCAA and its state-sup-
ported members, thereby making the NCAA a state actor.94 Further-
more, the NCAA is a state actor because public universities usually
have the largest number of students among NCAA members,9 5 and
"public institutions provide the vast majority of NCAA capital,"96 as
well as receive substantial benefits from the NCAA.97 As a result,
88. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1033.
89. Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213, 217-20 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
90. The foreign student rule provides: "Participation as an individual or as a repre-
sentative of any team whatever in a foreign country by an alien student-athlete in each
twelve-month period after his nineteenth birthday and prior to his matriculation at a
member institution shall count as one year of varsity competition." Id at 215 n.1 (cit-
ing NCAA Bylaw 4-1(f)(2)).
91. The five-year rule states: "[A student-athlete] must complete his seasons for
participation within five calendar years from the beginning of the semester or quarter
in which he first registered at a collegiate institution." Id. at 215 n.2 (citing NCAA
CONST. art. III, § 9(a)).
92. The 1.6 grade point average rule provides: "A member institution ... [must
limit] its scholarship or grant-in-aid awards.., and eligibility for participation in ath-
letics or in organized athletic practice sessions during the first year in residence to stu-
dent-athletes who have predicted minimum grade point averages of at least 1.600 ......
Id. at 216 n.3 (citing NCAA Bylaw 4-6(b)(1)).
93. Id. at 219.
94. Id. at 220. The court based its entanglement theory on the rationale that
"[c]onduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental poli-
cies or so impregnated with governmental character as to become subject to the consti-
tutional limitations placed upon state action." Id. at 217 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
95. Id. at 219.
96. Id. This result arises because NCAA contribution levels are based upon school
size and public schools are usually comprised of large student bodies. Id.
97. Id. at 220 (proceeds from lucrative television contracts flow primarily to public
schools).
state institutions are a major force in NCAA decision making.98 Fi-
nally, the Howard court summed up its logic by stating that the
NCAA and its state-supported institutions "are joined in a mutually
beneficial relationship . . .[that] form[s] the type of symbiotic rela-
tionship between public and private entities which triggers constitu-
tional scrutiny."99
2. Organizations Similar to the NCAA Held to be State Actors
Cases holding that the NCAA is a state actor have been reinforced
by case law in which private organizations with functions similar to
the NCAA were held to be state actors. For example, the Howard
court cited a line of casesl 00 in which private organizations were held
to be state actors for purposes of regulating high school athletic pro-
grams and extracurricular activities.1 01
In addition, a few cases have held that organizations similar to the
NCAA were state actors102 based upon prior decisions holding that
the NCAA was a state actor.103 In Tenorio v. Liga Atletica In-
98. Id. at 219. Furthermore, at the time Howard was being decided, both the
NCAA's president and secretary-treasurer were members of public institutions. Id.
99. Id. at 220 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Bur-
ton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
100. Id at 218; see, e.g., Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir.
1974); Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970);
Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1968); Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass'n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963);
Baltic Indep. School Dist. No. 115 v. South Dakota High School Activities Ass'n, 362 F.
Supp. 780 (D.S.D. 1973); Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 342 F. Supp. 1224
(D. Minn. 1972), qff'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities
Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
101. The Howard court, with the NCAA obviously in mind, commented on why
these high school private organizations constitute state action:
[T]he courts recognized that the organizations were private, voluntary associa-
tions, yet found state action by focusing on the facts that membership con-
sisted substantially of public high schools which provided personnel, facilities
and financial support, that the organizations' rules were promulgated by vote
of the members, including the public schools, and that the private organiza-
tions significantly regulated and affected the programs of these public entities,
including ... conducting state championship events, imposing restrictions on
practices and eligibility, and conducting investigations and meting out sanc-
tions. Consequently the organizations were sufficiently intertwined with state
instrumentalities, whose involvement was significant, albeit not exclusive, as
to be subject to constitutional restraints.
Howard, 510 F.2d at 218 (footnote omitted). Contra McDonald v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 625, 630-31 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (distinguishing the high school
cases and finding the NCAA to be a private entity).
102. See, e.g., Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1977)
(Puerto Rican equivalent to the NCAA); Williams v. Hamilton, 497 F. Supp. 641
(D.N.H. 1980) (National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics); Pavey v. University
of Alaska, 490 F. Supp 1011 (D. Alaska 1980) (Association for Intercollegiate Athletics
for Women).
103. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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teruniversitaria,10 4 the First Circuit held that the Liga Atletica In-
teruniversitaria (LAI), the Puerto Rican equivalent to the NCAA,
was a state actor under the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The
First Circuit relied on the arguments set forth in Howard,105 and
noted that four of the LAI's seven members were Commonwealth-
funded institutions.106 Thus, these institutions had "a dominant force
in determining LAI policy and in dictating LAI actions."1o 7
Similarly, in Williams v. Hamilton,0 8 the court analyzed the
"NCAA state taction cases"'109 and Tenorio to determine whether the
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA)110 was a
state actor when the NAIA ruled that the plaintiff, a soccer player,
was ineligible after transferring from another school."'1 Although
the NAIA attempted to distinguish itself from the NCAA,112 the
court held that the NAIA was a state actor because its public mem-
bers "contribute[d] substantially to its financial stability and decision-
making [sic] process." 1 3 Finally, in Pavey v. University of Alaska,114
the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) con-
ceded that it was a state actor under section 1983, based upon the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Associated Students, Inc. v. National Col-
legiate Athletics Association,115 which held that the NCAA was a
104. 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1977).
105. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
106. Tenorio, 554 F.2d at 495.
107. Id. (citing Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213,
219 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). Moreover, the court held that, "[the] LAI and its member public
instrumentalities are joined in a mutually beneficial relationship and in fact may be
fairly said to form the type of symbiotic relationship between public and private enti-
ties which triggers constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 496 (citation omitted).
108. 497 F. Supp. 641 (D.N.H. 1980).
109. Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Asso-
ciated Students, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.
1974).
110. The NAIA's membership "is a voluntary association of 512 four-year colleges
ranging in size from small ... to moderate ... whose primary purpose" is similar to
the NCAA's. Williams, 497 F. Supp. at 643.
111. Id. The transfer eligibility rule requires a student-athlete transferring to a
new school to wait 16 calendar weeks to establish residency at the new school before
eligibility is granted. Id. at 643-44 (citation omitted).
112. The NAIA argued it was different from the NCAA because state-supported
schools comprised only 33% of the NAIA's membership and 37% of its total dues. Fur-
thermore, private institutions represented a majority on both the NAIA's Executive
Committee and the National Eligibility Committee. Id. at 644.
113. Id. at 645.
114. 490 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Alaska 1980).
115. 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
state actor.
Thus, Parish, Howard, and their progeny provide three different
reasons to support the conclusion that the NCAA is a state actor.
First, "the NCAA performs a public function by regulating intercol-
legiate athletics."" 6 Second, "substantial interdependence [exists]
between the NCAA and the state institutions that comprise about
one-half of its membership."n7 Finally, "state institutional members
play[] a substantial .. . role in NCAA funding and decision mak-
ing."118 All in all, four circuits of the courts of appealsll 9 found these
arguments sufficiently persuasive to find state action on the NCAA's
behalf. Nevertheless, this precedent was insufficient to persuade a
majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court.
D. Judicial Opinions: The NCAA as a Private Actor
During the period when most cases held that the NCAA was a
state actor, McDonald v. National Collegiate Athletic Association120
stood alone in upholding the NCAA's private status and avoiding sec-
tion 1983 liability. In McDonald, two basketball players121 from the
California State University at Long Beach 122 were declared ineligible
for violating the 1.6 grade point average rule.12 3 They sought an in-
junction under section 1983 to enjoin the NCAA from declaring them
ineligible.124 The fact that one-half of the NCAA's members were
state-supported schools 125 concurring with NCAA policies and deci-
sion making did not persuade the district court.126 Rather than look-
116. Martin, supra note 3, at 61 n.77 (citing Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032 (5th Cir. 1975)).
117. Id. (citing Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213,
219 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
118. Id. (citing Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032); see Howard, 510 F.2d at 219.
119. The following circuits have held that the NCAA is a state actor: Regents of
Univ. of Minn. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 560 F.2d 352 (8th. Cir. 1977); How-
ard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students,
Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletics Ass'n, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
120. 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
121. The two basketball players were Glenn S. McDonald and Roscoe Pondexter
[sic]. Id. at 626.
122. Interestingly, Jerry Tarkanian was the coach at the California State Univer-
sity at Long Beach during the period in which the alleged violations took place. See
infra note 167.
123. McDonald, 370 F. Supp. at 626, 628. For text of the 1.6 grade point average
rule, see supra note 92.
124. Id. at 626.
125. U.S. District Court Judge Real criticized the holding in Parish, which was
partly based on state institutions representing half of the NCAA, as being a "quantita-
tivef conclu[sion]." Id. at 630.
126. Id. at 631-32. The court further stated that:
[v]oluntary concurrence of a state in a decision of an organization (NCAA) or
other body-not a state, state instrumentality, or sovereign equivalent-does
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ing at the acts of the NCAA, the court reasoned that "it is the act of
the state ... that must be measured by constitutional standards."127
Consequently, a state-supported school's concurrence with NCAA de-
cisions is insufficient to give rise to state action.128
1. Supreme Court Narrows State Action
By 1982, the weight of precedent favored the NCAA as a state ac-
tor. 29 Nevertheless, three Supreme Court cases,' 30 decided on the
same dayi3 1 in 1982, became the impetus for changing such prece-
dent.132 Although none of these cases directly concerned the NCAA,
the NCAA inevitably benefited from the views put forth by the
Supreme Court, which was attempting to limit the scope of conceiva-
ble state action. 133
In Blum v. Yaretsky,134 medicaid patients in private nursing homes
challenged the decision of a reviewing panel of physicians appointed
by the state to transfer them to lower levels of care without affording
due process.135 Despite the government's involvement in setting up
the review panel of physicians, the Court ruled that the actions were
performed solely by private physicians, who based their decision on
professional standards. 36 The Court stated that "a State normally
can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exer-
cised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement,
either overt or covert, that the choice must ... be deemed to be that
of the State."'137
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,138 the Court relied upon similar reason-
not make the acts of the organization (NCAA) 'state action' in a constitutional
sense. Rather it is the concurrence by the state... that is state action.
Id. at 631 (emphasis in original and added).
127. Id. at 632.
128. Id. at 631-32; see supra note 126.
129. See cases cited supra notes 75-76.
130. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
131. Blum, 457 U.S. at 991; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 922; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830.
132. See generally Martin, supra note 3, at 60-61; Comment, supra note 1, at 442-43.
133. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (demonstrating that section 1983
cases burden the federal court system, prompting the Supreme Court to limit the
scope and definition of state action).
134. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
135. Id. at 995-96.
136. Id. at 994-95.
137. Id at 1004. The Court further stated that mere regulation, subsidization, or
acquiescence in the actions of a private party do not create state action. Id. at 1004-05.
138. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
ing to hold that a private high school for maladjusted students did
not act under color of law when it discharged its teachers.139 The
Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the school was
regulated by the government, received most of its students by refer-
ral from public schools, and public funds accounted for over 90% of
its budget.140 Finally, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. ,141 the Court
held that a private party's joint participation with state officials in
the seizure of disputed property constituted state action.142 The
Court interpreted its cases to require "that the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the
State."143
2. Effect of Supreme Court on NCAA's State Action Status
The impact of Blum, Rendell-Baker, and Lugar has led to a new
line of cases144 holding that the NCAA is not a state actor under sec-
tion 1983. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Arlosoroff v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n145 examined Blum and Rendell-
Baker's impact on the so-called "NCAA state action cases."'146 In
Arlosoroff, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the NCAA from declaring
him ineligible to play for Duke University because he had partici-
pated in amateur tennis tournaments and had played on Israel's Da-
vis Cup team.147 Subsequent analysis of the Arlosoroff case revealed
139. Id. at 840-43.
140. Id.
141. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
142. Id. at 942.
143. Id. at 937. This requirement imposed by the Court contains a two-part
approach:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privi-
lege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a
person for whom the State is responsible .... Second, the party charged with
the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.
This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with
or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is
otherwise chargeable to the State.
Id.
144. See, e.g., McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir. 1988); Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986);
Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984); Hawkins
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Kneeland v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 650 F. Supp 1047 (W.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 868 (1989); McHale v. Cor-
nell Univ., 620 F. Supp 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
145. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
146. The court commented on cases such as Parish and Howard by stating: "These
earlier cases rested upon the notion that indirect involvement of state governments
could convert what otherwise would be considered private conduct into state action.
That notion has now been rejected by the Supreme Court, however, and its decisions
require a different conclusion." Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021 (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at
991; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830).
147. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1020. The NCAA regulation, Bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3), at issue
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that the NCAA could only be a state actor if the plaintiff can prove:
(1) that the state supported members of the NCAA exercised coercive power
or provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert.., that the
choice must be deemed to be that of the state; or (2) that the NCAA, in apply-
ing its rules, has performed a public function which has traditionally been the
exclusive prerogative of the state.14 8
Under the first theory espoused above, the Arlosoroff court held
that the NCAA is not a state actor even though half of its members
are state-supported schools providing over half of the NCAA's reve-
nue.149 Furthermore, the court stated that while the NCAA may
"perform a public function as the overseer of the nation's intercolle-
giate athletics . . . [this] regulation of intercollegiate athletics, how-
ever, is not a function 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the
state.'"150 As a result, "[tihe adoption of the Bylaw was private con-
duct, not state action."151
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar result in Graham v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n.1 5 2 Relying heavily on the language in
Arlosoroff, the Court determined that the NCAA was not a state ac-
tor for adopting the five-year rule153 or the transfer rule.154 The Gra-
ham court agreed with the Arlosoroff opinion and held that
regulating intercollegiate athletics is not a function exclusive to the
in Arlosoroff, states that any participation in "organized competition in a sport during
each twelve month period after the student's 20th birthday and prior to matriculation
with a member institution should count as one year of varsity competition in that
sport." Id
148. McHale, 620 F. Supp. at 69 (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05 (1982); Rendell-
Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-42).
149. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021-22. The court commented on the fact that the
NCAA was nearly equally divided between state and private schools by stating:
Those facts, however, do not alter the basic character of the NCAA as a vol-
untary association of public and private institutions. Nor do they begin to sug-
gest that the public institutions, in contrast with private institutional
members, caused or procured the adoption of the Bylaw .... There is no sug-
gestion in this case that the representatives of the state institutions joined to-
gether to vote as a bloc to effect adoption of the Bylaw over the objection of
private institutions. There is simply no showing that the state institutions
controlled or directed the result.
IH
150. Id at 1021 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
This rationale is buttressed by the holding in Rendell-Baker in which the Court held
that "the operation of a school [i.e., education] ... is [not] traditionally an exclusive
prerogative of the state." Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842).
151. Id. at 1022.
152. 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986).
153. See supra note 91.
154. See supra note 111. The plaintiffs were two football players from the Univer-
sity of Louisville who were declared ineligible because of the five-year and transfer
rules. Graham, 804 F.2d at 954-56.
states.1 5 5 Furthermore, the NCAA's adoption of these rules does not
give rise to state action since no "state-supported university caused,
directed, or controlled the implementation of the[se] . .. rules."'156
Additionally, in McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n,157 the Fifth Circuit followed the lead of Arlosoroff and Gra-
ham, holding that the NCAA was not a state actor for promulgating
rules which inevitably resulted in the "death penalty,"'158 a two-year
suspension, for Southern Methodist University's football team for
various violations of NCAA regulations. 159 In so doing, the Fifth Cir-
cuit overruled its holding in Parish that the NCAA was a state
actor.160
By 1988, it was evident that the federal circuit courts of appeals
were split in determining the issue of state action. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian 161
was faced with diametrically opposed circuit court rulings concerning
whether the actions of the NCAA constitute state action under sec-
tion 1983.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual History
The University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) is a branch of the
University of Nevada system, pursuant to the Nevada Constitution, 162
and is a state-supported member of the NCAA. During the early
1970's, the NCAA, after receiving anonymous tips, began to gather in-
formation about possible violations surrounding the UNLV athletic
department.16 3 On November 28, 1972, the NCAA sent a letter to the
president of UNLV advising that the NCAA was conducting a pre-
liminary inquiry164 into the practices and policies of UNLV's athletic
department. 65
155. Graham, 804 F.2d at 958 (citations omitted).
156. Id.
157. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
158. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
159. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340, 1343-45.
160. The McCormack court stated:
We therefore conclude that Parish is no longer good law and join the virtually
unanimous roster of courts that have held, since the decisions in Rendell-
Baker and Blum, that the NCAA is not the state or state agency and hence
does not act under color of law within the meaning of § 1983.
Id. at 1346.
161. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
162. NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
163. Brief for Petitioner at 8, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109
S. Ct. 454 (1988) (No. 87-1061).
164. "The purpose of the NCAA's preliminary inquiry is to determine whether
there is adequate evidence to warrant an official inquiry." Id.
165. Id. Although the preliminary inquiry letter was sent to UNLV several months
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Meanwhile, in March of 1973, Jerry Tarkanian16 6 announced that
he would accept the head coaching position for UNLV's basketball
team.167 Subsequently, on February 25, 1976, after over two years of
investigating UNLV,168 the NCAA's Committee on Infractions (the
before Tarkanian was hired by UNLV, Tarkanian was the basketball coach during the
course of subsequent investigations. Id.
166. Jerry Tarkanian is one of the more controversial coaches in the NCAA as evi-
denced by his clashes with the association. However, in Las Vegas, he and the UNLV
Runnin' Rebels are the top attraction in a town full of stars. An excerpt from
Tarkanian's book reads: "Las Vegas is Tarkanian's town. For clues you can see the fol-
lowing: Jerry Tarkanian T-shirts . . . towels... posters ... basketballs... masks...
stuffed sharks... shark candy, cookies, and drinks... shark earrings ... shark hats
. .. and 'Sharks,' the hottest disco in town." J. TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, TARK-COL-
LEGE BASKETBALL'S WINNINGEST COACH 346 (1988).
Despite his controversial nature, Tarkanian has the highest career winning percent-
age among all active college basketball coaches. L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1989, at C14, col.
6. During his 21-year career, Tarkanian has compiled 530 victories against 114 losses,
which is a winning percentage of 83.2%. Id, Tarkanian's success at UNLV has also
brought him financial rewards: use of a Cadillac; a $173,855 salary; $80,000 in potential
postseason revenues; an endorsement contract with Nike shoes; a promotional arrange-
ment with the Las Vegas nightclub, "Sharks"; and a sporting goods store at Las Vegas'
McCarren Airport. Gup, supra note 1, at 57. Furthermore, Tarkanian is notorious for
chewing on a white towel during critical moments in basketball games, and uses the
nickname of "Tark" or "Shark." J. TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, supra, at 346.
Moreover, the atmosphere surrounding UNLV is unique in college basketball. For
example, traditional Las Vegas celebrities such as Wayne Newton and Frank Sinatra
have come to watch UNLV at the Thomas & Mack Center, which has indoor fireworks
before the pregame introduction of the players and Tarkanian. Also, there are eight
front row seats, known as "Gucci Row," which are $1,500 each. Furthermore, the
UNLV basketball program usually takes in over $3,000,000 in profits annually. Id, at
347.
167. J. TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, supra note 166, at 116. Prior to accepting the head
coach position at UNLV, Tarkanian had coached for five years at the California State
University at Long Beach (CSULB), where he had turned around the dismal CSULB
basketball team which made the NCAA's basketball tournament in only his second
year as coach. Id, at 72. He was extremely successful at CSULB where he compiled a
122-20 win-loss record, which included a 65-0 record in home games. Id at 98.
As with UNLV, Tarkanian was the subject of controversy while at CSULB. After
he left CSULB, the school was put on a three-year probation on January 6, 1974, for
alleged violations of NCAA regulations by the football and basketball teams.
Tarkanian's departure from CSULB prior to its discipline by the NCAA implied that
he was leaving CSULB because of the violations. However, Tarkanian denied knowl-
edge of the NCAA's investigation into CSULB's program when he accepted the posi-
tion at UNLV. Id. at 112. Moreover, two of Tarkanian's players brought suit in
McDonald v. National Collegiate Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974); see supra
notes 120-27 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Tarkanian, as well as others, have
expressed the notion that the NCAA is engaged in a vendetta against Tarkanian which
followed him from CSULB to UNLV. J. TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, supra note 166, at
160.
168. See Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 103 Nev. 331, 333, 741 P.2d
1345, 1346 (1987).
Committee) 16 9 sent UNLV a letter of "official inquiry,"170 which con-
sisted of fifty-four pages alleging seventy-eight separate violations of
NCAA rules, half of which implicated Tarkanian.171 The letter re-
quested that UNLV investigate and provide detailed information con-
cerning the allegations.17 2 It also asked for the cooperation of
UNLV's president. 173
UNLV subsequently responded174 to the NCAA's official inquiry
by rebutting each allegation and "submit[ting] two boxes of sworn
statements, affidavits, and other documentary evidence supporting
169. The Supreme Court outlined the role of the Committee:
The NCAA's bylaws provide that its enforcement program shall be adminis-
tered by a Committee on Infractions. The Committee supervises an investiga-
tive staff, makes factual determinations concerning alleged rule violations,
and is expressly authorized to impose appropriate penalties on a member
found to be in violation, or recommend to the Council suspension or termina-
tion of membership.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 457 (1988).
The sanctions the Committee could impose include:
(1) Reprimand and censure;
(2) Probation for one year;
(3) Probation for more than one year;
(4) Ineligibility for one or more [NCAA] championship events;
(5) Ineligibility for invitational and postseason meets and tournaments;
(6) Ineligibility for any television programs subject to the Association's control
or administration;
(7) Ineligibility of the member to vote or its personnel to serve on committees
of the Association, or both;
(8) Prohibition against an intercollegiate sports team or teams participating
against outside competition for a specified period;
(9) Prohibition against the recruitment of prospective student-athletes for a
sport or sports for a specified period ....
Id at 457-58 n.6 (citation omitted).
Moreover, "the Committee may order a member institution to show cause why that
member should not suffer further penalties unless it imposes a prescribed discipline on
an employee, it is not authorized, however, to sanction a member institution's employ-
ees directly." Id. at 458.
Furthermore, if discipline of an employee is necessary, "the Committee may require
the member to show cause why.., a penalty or additional penalty should not be im-
posed if, in the opinion of the Committee (or Council), it does not take appropriate
disciplinary or corrective action against athletic department personnel involved in the
infractions case ...." Id at 458 n.7 (citation omitted).
170. The purpose of an official inquiry is "to guide the institution to develop fully
and independently as much or more information as was developed by the NCAA
staff." Brief for Petitioner at 9, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S.
Ct. 454 (1988) (No. 87-1061).
171. Brief for Petitioner at 8. The official inquiry further alleged that Tarkanian
was involved in illegal conduct only two weeks after starting at UNLV. Id. at 9 n.5.
The inquiry reported that the 78 violations were related to, inter alia, recruiting viola-
tions which occurred between 1970 and 1976. See Tarkanian, 103 Nev. at 332, 741 P.2d
at 1346.
172. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 458.
173. Brief for Respondent at 5, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061).
174. UNLV enlisted the aid of the Nevada State Attorney General and private
counsel for the investigation. They collectively found that Tarkanian was innocent of
all alleged conduct. See Brief for Respondent at 6 nn.6 & 10.
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denials of the rule violations."175 Upon receiving UNLV's official re-
sponse, the NCAA's Committee on Infractions176 held three days of
hearings177 in which UNLV submitted its evidence.178 The Commit-
tee then issued confidential report No. 123(47), which reduced the
seventy-eight allegations against UNLV to thirty-eight, and found
only ten violations against Tarkanian personally. 79 Still, the com-
mittee imposed a number of sanctions against UNLV for the remain-
ing violations.180
After receiving the Committee's confidential report, UNLV and
175. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. at 334, 741 P.2d at 1346.
176. It is noteworthy that four of the five members on the infractions committee
were from state-supported schools. The members of the committee were: Arthur
Reynolds, Dean of the Graduate School, University of Northern Colorado, Chairman;
Alan Wright, Professor of Law, University of Texas; Harry M. Cross, Associate Dean
and Professor of Law, University of Washington; John W. Sawyer, Professor of Mathe-
matics, Wake Forest University; and William L. Mathews, Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Kentucky. Brief for Petitioner at 6 n.4, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061).
177. The hearings were held on November 14, and December 13 and 14, 1976. Brief
for Respondent at 10. The NCAA's evidence against Tarkanian consisted "solely of
having. . [an) NCAA staff investigator orally relate his recollection of conversations
he ... purportedly had with other individuals concerning their knowledge of [the]
facts or hearsay relating to the alleged violations." Id
Furthermore, the investigators were not sworn under oath, did not produce affida-
vits or sworn statements from any of the individuals interviewed, nor had any physical
evidence to present. Id
Finally, there was no written transcript of the hearing; the only record of the hear-
ing was the NCAA's tape recording of the proceedings. The NCAA specifically for-
bade UNLV from using a court reporter to transcribe the proceedings. Id at 8.
178. UNLV presented sworn statements made by the people identified in the alle-
gations involving Tarkanian. The sworn statements were in direct conflict with the
testimony given by NCAA staff investigators, who orally recounted the testimony
made by these people in front of the committee. Id at 11. However, the NCAA re-
fused to allow in-person testimony of the witnesses which implicated Tarkanian be-
cause it would allegedly "cost too much." Id. at 12.
179. Brief for Petitioner at 10; Brief for Respondent at 12. The most serious viola-
tion charged against Tarkanian was that he "had violated the University's obligation to
provide full cooperation with the NCAA investigation." Allegedly, he "attempted to
frustrate the NCAA's application of the rules by getting people to 'change their story'
or to fabricate bodies of countervailing evidence." Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 458-59 n.9.
180. Brief for Petitioner at 11. The sanctions imposed on UNLV included, inter
alia:
public reprimand of UNLV along with a two year period of probation during
which the UNLV's intercollegiate basketball program would not be eligible to
participate in any postseason basketball competition, nor appear on television
... a limit of three basketball scholarships to be given per year during the
1978-79 and 1979-80 academic years ....
Id
Furthermore, the committee requested UNLV:
to show cause ... why additional penalties should not be imposed upon the
Tarkanian appealed the Committee's findings and penalties 181 to the
sixteen-member NCAA Council 182 which is authorized to hold a
hearingl83 to review the Committee's findings.184 The Council unani-
mously's 5 voted to approve the Committee's findings and penal-
ties, 8 6 and thereafter notified UNLV of its holding.187
On September 6, 1977, from the impetus of the NCAA,188 UNLV
held a hearinglS9 for Tarkanian to show cause why he should not be
suspended.190 After this hearing, UNLV's vice president issued a
memorandum to the school's president outlining three possible
courses of action.191 The school's president decided to follow the vice
University if it does not take appropriate disciplinary and corrective actions
with regard to:
... Head basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian which, in the Committee's pres-
ent view, should be complete severance of any and all relations Tarkanian
may have, formally or informally, with the University's intercollegiate ath-
letic program during the period of the University's probation ....
Id. at 12; see Brief for Respondent at 13.
As a result of the NCAA's findings, and its dissemination to the media, Tarkanian
lost the opportunity to coach several basketball clinics in various states because spon-
sors cancelled such agreements. Brief for Respondent at 14 n.17.
181. All ten allegations charged against Tarkanian were appealed by UNLV and
Tarkanian. Brief for Petitioner at 13.
182. Of the sixteen members comprising the NCAA Council, nine were from state-
supported schools. Brief for Respondent at 15.
183. The hearing was held on August 22, 1977. Id
184. Brief for Petitioner at 16.
185. Id.
186. As previously stated, the Committee had no written transcripts of its hearings
and, thus, only submitted the confidential report with additional commentary to the
NCAA Council for its review. Brief for Respondent at 15; see supra note 177. Further-
more, the council personally interviewed the NCAA staff investigators upon whose
oral testimony the sanctions were initially based. However, UNLV and Tarkanian
were not given notice of this secret meeting and no transcript or recording of the
meeting was made. Brief for Respondent at 15.
187. Brief for Petitioner at 14.
188. Brief for Respondent at 16. The 1976-77 NCAA Manual obligates an institu-
tion to provide "due notice and a hearing" to an individual before it takes any discipli-
nary or corrective action. Id
189. "Tarkanian and UNLV were represented at the meeting, but the NCAA was
not." National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 459 (1988).
190. Brief for Petitioner at 14.
191. The vice president doubted the factual basis for the charges against Tarkanian,
"but concluded that UNLV was contractually compelled to adopt and implement the
findings and penalty specified in the NCAA's confidential report." Brief for Respon-
dent at 17. The three options were:
1. Reject the sanction requiring [UNLV] to disassociate ... Tarkanian from
the athletic department and take the risk of still heavier sanctions ....
2. Recognize the University's delegation to the NCAA of the power to act as
ultimate arbiter of these matters, thus reassigning . .. Tarkanian from his
present position-though tenure and without adequate notice-even while be-
lieving that the NCAA was wrong ....
3. Pull out of the NCAA completely on the grounds that [the president of
UNLVI will not execute what [he] hold[s] to be their unjust judgments.
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459 (citation omitted); Brief for Respondent at 17.
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president's advice to suspend Tarkanian,192 realizing that the other
two options would result in an even greater hardship to UNLV.
Thereafter, the president notified Tarkanian by letter93 that he was
suspended as of September 9, 1977.194 Consequently, on September 8,
1977, Tarkanian filed an action in Nevada state court, alleging viola-
tion of his due process rights. 195
B. Procedural History
Tarkanian's complaint listed UNLV and some of its officers as de-
fendants, but not the NCAA.196 The complaint alleged that
Tarkanian's suspension violated his due process rights under section
1983197 and the fourteenth amendment, 198 and requested declaratory
and injunctive relief removing the suspension.199UNLV answered the
complaint by stating that the litany of hearings provided by the
NCAA and UNLV afforded Tarkanian adequate due process.200
UNLV chose to argue the case in state court despite the availability
of removal to federal district court,20 ' pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(a)(3). 20 2
On October 12, 1977, the trial court granted Tarkanian's prelimi-
nary injunction, finding that UNLV did indeed violate his procedural
and substantive due process rights. UNLV appealed to the Nevada
Supreme Court,2o3 which reversed the trial court's findings because
UNLV had failed to join the NCAA-a necessary party to the case.204
The court's order directed that the NCAA be joined as a
192. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
193. The letter "notified Tarkanian that he was to 'be completely severed of any
and all relations, formal or informal, with the University's Intercollegiate athletic pro-
gram during the period of the University's NCAA probation.'" Id (citation omitted).
194. Brief for Respondent at 18.
195. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
196. Brief for Petitioner at 15.
197. See supra note 58 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
198. See supra note 60 for text of U.S. CoNST. amend XIV, § 1.
199. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
200. Brief for Respondent at 18.
201. Brief for Petitioner at 15.
202. See supra note 68 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982).
203. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459-60; see also Brief for Respondent at 18.
204. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 395-99, 594 P.2d 1159, 1163-65
(1979), qff'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 Nev. 331, 334, 741 P.2d 1345, 1347 (1987); see also
Brief for Petitioner at 15. In an an amicus curiae brief, the NCAA alleged that no
actual controversy existed between Tarkanian and UNLV and, thus, a dismissal of the
suit was required. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460. Alternatively, the NCAA argued that
the trial court had overstepped its scope of authority by its failure to join the NCAA
because the NCAA was a necessary party with respect to the scope of any relief. Id
defendant.205
Complying with the court's directive, Tarkanian filed a second law-
suit in Nevada state court naming both UNLV and the NCAA as de-
fendants.206 Subsequently, both the NCAA and UNLV attempted to
remove the case to federal court under section 1343(a)(3), by filing a
petition with the appropriate district court.207 However, because
UNLV had waived its right of removal by not removing the initial
lawsuit in 1977, the district court granted Tarkanian's motion to re-
mand the case back to state court.208
On June 25, 1984, after nearly four years had elapsed, the trial
court upheld Tarkanian's prior injunction, stating that both UNLV
and the NCAA were state actors under section 1983, and that
Tarkanian's denial of due process by the NCAA was "arbitrary and
capricious." 20 9 Consequently, the NCAA was enjoined from: compel-
ling UNLV to suspend Tarkanian, enforcing the penalties in the con-
fidential report, conducting further proceedings against UNLV, and
enforcing its show cause order against UNLV.210 Subsequent to the
trial court's decision, Tarkanian filed a petition for attorney's fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,211 which allows for reimbursement of
attorney's fees in section 1983 cases. The court granted Tarkanian's
petition, and the NCAA was ordered to pay ninety percent of
Tarkanian's attorney's fees which amounted to approximately
$200,000.212 On July 17, 1984, the NCAA filed another petition to re-
move the case to federal court because Tarkanian's request for attor-
ney's fees allegedly had substantially changed the litigation between
the parties. 213 When UNLV refused to join the removal petition, the
NCAA protested that UNLV should be realigned as a plaintiff "be-
Furthermore, the NCAA argued, like UNLV, that its proceedings afforded Tarkanian
adequate due process. Id.
205. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. at 399, 594 P.2d at 1165.
206. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 15.
209. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460. The trial judge, Paul Goldman, criticized the
NCAA enforcement procedures by saying, "[i]t might be considered efficient, but so
was Adolf Eichmann and so is the Ayatollah." N.Y. Times, June 26, 1984, at A23, col.
1.
210. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460. It is noteworthy that, despite the Supreme
Court's eventual reversal of this case, the injunction prohibiting UNLV from sus-
pending Tarkanian is final, and was therefore not before the Supreme Court. Brief for
Respondent at 21; see irtfra note 288 and accompanying text.
211. Section 1988 states in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
212. Brief for Petitioner at 16. UNLV was ordered to pay the remaining 10% in
fees. Id.
213. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
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cause they actually wanted Tarkanian to prevail" 2 14 The district
court again refused to grant the NCAA's request for removal because
UNLV had failed to do so in 1977.215 As a result, the NCAA ap-
pealed the injunction to the Nevada supreme court, even though
UNLV had decided to accept the trial court's findings.216
The Nevada supreme court issued its opinion on August 27,
1987,217 affirming the trial court's decision that the NCAA was a
state actor, and that the NCAA had denied Tarkanian substantive
and procedural due process.218 The court did limit the scope of the
injunction to "only... prohibit enforcement of the penalties imposed
upon Tarkanian in [the] [c]onfidential [rieport and UNLV's adoption
of those penalties." 219
The court focused on the ramifications of Rendell-Baker and Blum
on the present action and held that these cases did not necessarily
mandate the result that the NCAA is a private actor.220 Because
Tarkanian was a public employee working for UNLV, the court de-
duced that the NCAA was also a state actor because "the right to dis-
cipline public employees is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state" and "UNLV cannot escape responsibility for disciplinary
action against employees by delegating that duty to a private en-
tity."22 1 The court further distinguished Arlosoroff which held that
regulating athletics is not an exclusive state function, on the basis
that UNLV is a state-supported institution, while Duke University,
the school in Arlosoroff, is private.222 Furthermore, the court also
214. Id
215. Brief for Petitioner at 15. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's re-
fusal to remove the case from state jurisdiction. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
216. UNLV's rationale for not appealing the trial court's findings is obvious as the
trial court's decision allowed Tarkanian to continue coaching its basketball team.
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
217. Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345
(1987).
218. Id. at 337-41, 741 P.2d at 1349, 1351-54. However, the Nevada Supreme Court
reversed the award of attorney's fees under § 1988 as the trial court had compelled the
NCAA to pay Tarkanian's fees for the first trial when the NCAA had not been joined
as a party. Under § 1988, recovery of attorney's fees is awarded only to a prevailing
party and, because the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the trial court's initial injunc-
tion favoring Tarkanian, he is not entitled to attorney's fees for that part of the case.
Id. at 341-42, 741 P.2d at 1352.
219. I& at 343, 741 P.2d at 1353.
220. Id. at 336-37, 741 P.2d at 1348-49.
221. Id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1348.
222. Id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1349.
upheld its decision against the two-part test contained in Lugar.223
On December 23, 1987, the NCAA filed for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court which was granted on February 22,
1988,224 and the case was limited to the issue of whether the NCAA
was a state actor.225
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court's narrow 5-4 decision to reverse
the Nevada supreme court's ruling in National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Tarkanian226 marked the first, but final, loss for Tarkanian
in his battle against the NCAA.227 Justice Stevens' opinion 228 mea-
sured the state supreme court's ruling in favor of Tarkanian against
the backdrop of Supreme Court precedent which has interpreted and
narrowed the meaning of "state action." 229 Thus, the Nevada court,
in the eyes of the Supreme Court, "traveled" a bit too far in declaring
that the NCAA was a state actor.
223. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); see also supra note
143 and accompanying text for Lugar's two-part test. The Tarkanian court held that:
The first prong is met because no third party could impose disciplinary sanc-
tions upon a state university employee unless the third party received the
right or privilege from the university. Thus, the deprivation which Tarkanian
alleges is caused by the exercise of a right or privilege created by the state.
Also... both UNLV and the NCAA must be considered state actors. By dele-
gating authority to the NCAA over athletic personnel decisions and by impos-
ing the NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with the
NCAA.
Tarkanian, 103 Nev. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1349.
224. Brief for Petitioner at 1, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109
S. Ct. 454 (1988) (No. 87-1061).
225. The question presented to the Court was:
Whether the action of the NCAA in directing one of its members, a state uni-
versity, to show cause why it should not temporarily suspend an employee
from his duties relating to intercollegiate athletics for violating the Associa-
tion's rules, constitutes state action, where the member university, in compli-
ance with NCAA rules, suspends the coach from coaching.
Id. at 2.
226. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
227. The NCAA complained that Tarkanian had a "home-court advantage" in his
victories over the NCAA in the Nevada state courts. Brief for Petitioner at 27.
228. Justice Stevens was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456.
229. Id, at 460-63. The Court stated that "[embedded in our Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny
under the Amendment's Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the
Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be." Id. at 461
(citing Shelley v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (footnote omitted)); see also Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
In addition, the Court noted that "protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not
extend to 'private conduct abridging individual rights.'" Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461
(citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
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The state high court ruled that the NCAA was a state actor partly
because "UNLV had delegated its authority over personnel decisions
to the NCAA" and that "the two entities acted jointly to deprive
Tarkanian of liberty and property interests."230 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court correctly pointed out that while UNLV's decision to
suspend Tarkanian was based on NCAA rules and recommendations,
it was UNLV, and not the NCAA, which actually suspended
Tarkanian.231 As such, UNLV had not actually delegated any author-
ity to the NCAA because the NCAA's only authority in the matter
was to threaten UNLV with additional sanctions or possible expul-
sion from the membership if UNLV did not comply with the "show
cause order."232 The NCAA could not directly suspend Tarkanian. 233
Furthermore, the Court rejected the notion that UNLV and the
NCAA acted in concert to suspend Tarkanian.234 Looking at the fac-
tual23 5 and procedural history236 of the case, the Court stated, "It is
quite obvious that UNLV used its best efforts to retain its winning
coach-a goal diametrically opposed to the NCAA's interest in ascer-
taining the truth of the investigators' reports."2 37 Thus, it was incor-
rect for the state court to presume that UNLV and the NCAA acted
jointly during the proceedings against Tarkanian because the two en-
tities "acted much more like adversaries than ... partners engaged in
a dispassionate search for the truth."238 Instead of acting jointly with
UNLV, the NCAA was actually "an agent of its remaining members
which, as competitors of UNLV, had an interest in the effective and
evenhanded enforcement of NCAA's recruitment standards."23 9
230. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462. Tarkanian claimed that UNLV, by allegedly dele-
gating its own function of disciplining a state employee to the NCAA had, "cloth[ed]
the Association with authority... to adopt rules governing UNLV's athletic programs
and to enforce those rules on behalf of UNLV." IM. at 461-62.
231. Id. at 462.
232. IM at 465.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 464-65.
235. See supra notes 162-94 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 196-225 and accompanying text.
237. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 (1988). But see supra note 177 in which it appears
that the NCAA did not seem compelled to establish the veracity of its investigators.
238. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464. The court emphasized the conflict between the
two entities by saying: "[T]hey have clashed throughout the investigation, the attempt
to discipline Tarkanian, and this litigation. UNLV and the NCAA were antagonists,
not joint participants, and the NCAA may not be deemed a state actor on this ground."
Id, at 464 n.16.
239. Id. The Court analogized this case to Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320
(1981), where a public defender who is employed by the state is a private actor when
representing a private client against the state. Id. The Court applied the reasoning in
Another argument pressed by Tarkanian and the Nevada court, as
well as cases such as Parish and Howard, is that the NCAA is a state
actor because about half of its membership is state-supported. The
Court conceded that Nevada's membership in the NCAA may have
had some impact on NCAA policy.240 Nevertheless, such an impact is
small when compared to the vast majority of other institutions lo-
cated outside of Nevada which equally affect NCAA policy and do
not act pursuant to Nevada law.241 As a result, the NCAA's legisla-
tion does not evolve from Nevada or UNLV, but rather through "the
collective membership speaking through an organization that is in-
dependent of any particular [s]tate."24 2
Perhaps the most persuasive argument formulated by Tarkanian
and the Nevada court against the NCAA was that the "NCAA[ ] as-
sumed the state's traditional and exclusive power to discipline its em-
ployees."243 After all, only a state can discipline its own employees.
However, this argument fails because the facts in Tarkanian mani-
fest that UNLV actually suspended Tarkanian, while the NCAA
could only discipline UNLV for not suspending Tarkanian. The
NCAA could not suspend him pursuant to its regulations. 244 Fur-
thermore, any argument that the NCAA expropriated an exclusive
and traditional state function by promulgating its rules and enforce-
ment procedures is meritless since regulation of education or inter-
collegiate athletics is not an exclusive state function.245
Tarkanian's last argument against the NCAA-which perhaps was
a final "desperation shot"-was that the NCAA was, in effect, a mo-
Dodson by stating, "[T]he NCAA is properly viewed as a private actor at odds with the
state when it represents the interests of its entire membership in an investigation of
one public university." Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 (footnote omitted).
240. Id. at 462.
241. Id.
242. Id. The Court emphasized that the NCAA is not a state actor merely because
UNLV adopted NCAA regulations by stating: "Neither UNLV's decision to adopt the
NCAA's standards nor its 'minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for
concluding that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated
standards governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic performance." Id. at
463.
The Court indicated the situation would be different if, as in the "high school cases,"
all of the NCAA's members were located within one state where the majority of insti-
tutions are public. Id. at 462 n.13. For a discussion of the "high school cases," see
supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
243. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465. In Tarkanian's brief to the Court, the coach ar-
gued, "the NCAA requires that its standards, procedures and determinations become
the State's standards, procedures and determinations for disciplining state employees
... [thereby obligating the state] to impose NCAA standards, procedures and determi-
nations making the NCAA a joint participant in the State's suspension of Tarkanian."
Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 34-35, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061)).
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
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nopoly, and thus UNLV had no practical alternative but to comply
with the NCAA's decision regarding Tarkanian's discipline.2 46 How-
ever, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison C0.247 explicitly held that the
state's mere conferral of monopoly status on a private party does not
convert that party's conduct into state action.248
Before deciding Tarkanian's fate, the Court examined its prior case
law, which had stated that a private entity can only be a state actor if
its "conduct . . . causing the deprivation of a federal right can be
fairly attributed to the State."249 The Court stated that it would be
anomalous to hold that the NCAA's sanctions against UNLV are
"fairly attributable" to the State of Nevada, when the state itself,
through UNLV and the Nevada Attorney General, opposed the
NCAA's sanctions.250 The Court concluded "that UNLV has con-
ducted its athletic program under color of the policies adopted by the
NCAA, rather than that those policies were developed and enforced
under color of Nevada law."25 1 In essence, UNLV acted under color
of NCAA law-not vice-versa.
Surprisingly, in analyzing the case sub judice, the Supreme Court
did not consider the "NCAA state action cases," 252 its holdings in
Blum and Rendell-Baker, or appellate cases, such as Arlosoroff and
Graham, holding the NCAA to be a private actor. After all, the
246. Id at 465. The Court expressed its hesitancy to accept the notion that UNLV
was powerless: "The University's desire to remain a powerhouse among the nation's
college basketball teams is understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA obvi-
ously would thwart that goal. But that UNLV's options are unpalatable does not mean
they were nonexistent." Id. at 465 n.19.
However, at least one commentator has suggested that such reasoning by the Court
may not be completely sound:
The response of the NCAA to dissidents when criticism of its actions arises
has always been that it is a voluntary association and that its dissatisfied mem-
bers may simply leave. However, for the institution that wanted prestige in
[major collegiate athletics], just as for the institution that simply wanted a cut
of the NCAA's television revenue, membership was far from voluntary.
Despite the Supreme Court's break-up of the organization's television mo-
nopoly, there is still no alternative for the institution seeking any real form of
athletic prominence. In the high pressure sport of major intercollegiate bas-
ketball, there is no substitute for the season-end NCAA tournament. To vary-
ing degrees, this holds true in the other intercollegiate sports.
Martin, supra note 3, at 56 (footnotes omitted).
247. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
248. Id at 351-52.




252. See cases cited supra notes 75-76.
Court's logic in sustaining the NCAA's private authority seems to
parallel those later cases. Yet, the Court's decision reflects the grow-
ing trend not to find state action when a private entity is involved
with a state actor. The Tarkanian Court reiterated this sentiment,
which was stated in Lugar, by noting that "[c]areful adherence to the
'state action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by
limiting the reach of federal law" 25 3 and the notion of state action
"avoids the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could
not control." 254
B. Justice White's Dissenting Opinion
Three Justices2 55 joined Justice White's256 appraisal that the
NCAA is a state actor because it acted jointly with UNLV in sus-
pending Tarkanian. 2s 7 The dissent cited two Supreme Court cases258
holding that a private party was a state actor when the final act of
deprivation was carried out by the state official, because the private
party was jointly engaged with state officials.259 Following this line
of reasoning, the dissent listed three separate reasons why UNLV
and the NCAA were jointly participating as state actors in sus-
pending Tarkanian.2 6 0
First, the dissent argued there was joint action because UNLV em-
braced the rules of the NCAA in its membership agreement and sus-
pended Tarkanian based on those rules.261 This is supported by the
fact that UNLV administers its athletic department in accordance
with NCAA regulations, which state that "enforcement procedures
are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic program of each
member institution."262
253. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936).
254. Id. (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936).
255. Justice White was joined in the dissenting opinion by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and O'Connor. Id. at 466.
256. Justice White, nicknamed "Whizzer," was an all-American running back for
the University of Colorado football team, and he won the Heisman trophy award in
1937 as the outstanding collegiate football player. As such, he and his school came
under the direction of the NCAA. THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2968 (4th ed.
1975).
257. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
258. Id.; see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (defendant private party who will-
fully conspired with state judge to have the judge issue meritless injunction against
plaintiff was state actor); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (defendant
private party who reached agreement with state police officers to arrest plaintiff on
impermissible grounds was state actor).
259. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
260. Id at 466-68 (White, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
262. Id (White, J., dissenting) (quoting University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev.
389, 391, 594 P.2d 1159, 1160 (1979); aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 Nev. 331, 334, 741
P.2d 1345, 1347 (1987)).
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Second, the dissent claimed joint action occurred because, as part
of the membership agreement, UNLV and the NCAA impliedly
agreed that the NCAA would conduct the initial hearings pertaining
to Tarkanian's alleged violations of its rules.263 The membership
agreement between the two entities provided that the Committee on
Infractions would hold hearings to determine the factual basis for al-
leged violations, subject to the approval of the NCAA council.264
The dissent's final argument for joint action was that the two enti-
ties "agreed that the findings of fact made by the NCAA at the hear-
ings it conducted would be binding on UNLV."265 This was bolstered
by the fact that the vice president of UNLV, while doubting the ve-
racity of the NCAA's findings, felt contractually bound to accept the
NCAA's findings as UNLV's own, which ultimately led to
Tarkanian's suspension.266 The dissent summed up its "joint action"
analysis by commenting that "it was the NCAA's findings that
Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted
hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNLV in its membership
agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in Tarkanian's suspension
by UNLV."267
Additionally, the dissent criticized the majority's logic in holding
that the NCAA is a private actor, by comparing the facts of this case
to Dennis v. Sparks.268 Although the majority relied heavily on the
fact that the NCAA could not discipline Tarkanian directly, the dis-
sent argued that this also was the case in Dennis, where the defend-
ant private party did not have'the authority to issue a meritless
injunction against the plaintiff.269 Like the trial judge in Dennis,
UNLV was the only one who could provide the act which deprived
the plaintiff of his rights.2 70
Although the majority argued that UNLV could have voluntarily
withdrawn from NCAA membership, the dissent noted that the
judge in Dennis also could have removed himself from the conspiracy
to grant a meritless injunction.2 71 The critical point is that neither
263. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
264. Id at 466-67 (White, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).
266. Id. (White, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
267. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 466 (White, J., dissenting); see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); see
also supra note 258.
269. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).
270. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
271. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
UNLV, nor the judge in Dennis, actually rescinded their respective
agreements. 272
Finally, the animosity between UNLV and the NCAA during the
proceedings provided an impetus for the majority's finding that there
was no joint action. Nevertheless, the dissent compared this animos-
ity to the possibility that the judge in Dennis might have tried to per-
suade the defendant that granting an injunction was improper. The
dissent stated that "[t]he key ... as with any conspiracy, is that ulti-
mately the parties agreed to take the action."273 Hence, the dissent
urged that, despite the animosity between UNLV and the NCAA,
UNLV eventually accepted the NCAA's findings as their own, and
conspired to suspend Tarkanian.
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court's holding in Tarkanian ended a fifteen-year
debate between the federal district and appellate courts as to the sta-
tus of the NCAA vis-a-vis the "state action" requirement under the
fourteenth amendment and section 1983.274 Although the argu-
ments contained in the "NCAA state action cases" 275 were factually
and logically based, and cited by subsequent appellate and district
court cases, 276 such arguments could not withstand the judicial pres-
sure of limiting the scope of "state action." As a result, while the
NCAA may be labeled as a "quasi-state actor," due to its involvement
with state institutions and its performance of nonexclusive state
functions, such a label does not provide those under the NCAA's aus-
pices with any Constitutional guarantees.
A. Impact on Future Section 1983 Claims
The Supreme Court's decision in Tarkanian follows in the foot-
steps of cases such as Jackson, Blum, and Rendell-Baker, which estab-
lished an exacting threshold for a section 1983 plaintiff to cross when
seeking vindication of the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest. Although a private entity may be granted monopoly status
by the state,277 receive over ninety percent of its funds from the
state,278 be given the right to make administrative decisions by the
state,2 79 or be able to compel the state to suspend a state employee,280
272. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 468 (White, J., dissenting).
274. See supra notes 58, 60.
275. See supra note 109.
276. See cases cited supra notes 75-76.
277. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
278. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
279. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
280. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct 454 (1988).
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such action does not rise to the level of constitutional protection. It
may be that a narrower scope of state action is a manifestation of the
shift toward a more conservative Court281 as the Bush administration
commences; or perhaps the Court is trying to limit the burden on the
federal courts which has escalated, in part, from the multitude of sec-
tion 1983 claims. 28 2 Whatever the motivation, the effect is that plain-
tiffs, such as Tarkanian,28 3 who have suffered a deprivation of
Constitutional rights, may find their options decreasing in the future.
B. Future Impact on the NCAA
The Court's decision in Tarkanian may provide the NCAA with an
effective deterrent against members and their athletes, who may now
think twice before violating NCAA rules. With the Supreme Court's
stamp of approval, the NCAA can promulgate its regulations, investi-
gate possible violators, and enforce its disciplinary measures without
fear of protracted court battles involving due process claims, such as
the eleven-year ordeal in Tarkanian.28 4 Furthermore, issues such as
drug testing,285 steroid abuse, and compensation for student-athletes
have become areas of debate, for which the NCAA may offer solu-
tions which could draw spirited opposition. Nevertheless, the
NCAA's triumph over Tarkanian may be the first step in a series of
changes surrounding the NCAA and the integrity of intercollegiate
athletics.
281. All five Supreme Court Justices constituting the majority in Tarkanian are
republicans who were selected by republican presidents. President Richard Nixon ap-
pointed both Justice Rehnquist, who was named Chief Justice by President Ronald
Reagan, and Justice Blackmun. President Ford appointed Justice Stevens, and Presi-
dent Reagan appointed Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Conversely, three of the four dis-
senting Justices-Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall-are democrats, with the
exception being Justice O'Connor. See Howard, Living With the Warren Legacy,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 69-70; see also S. GOLDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 538, table 8.1 (1982).
282. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
283. Because the question presented to the Tarkanian Court was limited to the
state action issue, it did not decide whether Tarkanian was denied his due process of
law. However, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that
Tarkanian's rights had been violated. Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
103 Nev. 331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987). Furthermore, Justice White, in his dis-
sent, stated that he took it as a given that "the hearings provided to Tarkanian were
constitutionally inadequate." Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
284. Tarkanian filed his initial suit in Nevada on September 8, 1977, and the
Supreme Court handed down its verdict on December 12, 1988. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct.
at 454, 456.
285. See Comment, Mandatory Drug Testing of College Athletes: Are Athletes Being
Denied Their Constitutional Rights?, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 45 (1988).
Hopefully, the NCAA will not abuse its monopolistic privileges
with overzealous or selective enforcement of membership rules. The
many critics of the NCAA fear that the NCAA may become too pow-
erful and hurt college athletics with a myriad of disciplinary proceed-
ings which draw great publicity. If the NCAA becomes too
overbearing, disgruntled universities may join together to form a
competing entity to challenge the NCAA's reign.28 6 As professional
athletic contracts continue to rise at an unprecedented rate, the lure
of enticing student-athletes into professional sports will inevitably
create a higher level of competition at the collegiate ranks. The in-
creased competition will lead to additional pressures to succeed,
thereby raising the possibility of violating NCAA rules. In the end, it
will be the actions of the NCAA, and not its members, that will dic-
tate the rise or fall of intercollegiate athletics.
Furthermore, the Court's opinion should allow athletic and private
organizations similar to the NCAA,287 to have a more distinct role in
promulgating rules and disciplining members or employees.
C. Impact on Tarkanian
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Tarkanian, specula-
tion surfaced concerning what actions the NCAA would take with re-
gard to UNLV and Tarkanian. Although UNLV suspended
Tarkanian in 1977, he has avoided such suspension up until now.
However, the NCAA is not yet in a position to compel UNLV to sus-
pend Tarkanian. Before any such discipline can occur, the Nevada
supreme court must lift the injunction prohibiting Tarkanian's sus-
pension.288 Until this occurs, Tarkanian can continue to coach into
the 1990s despite his suspension for alleged rule violations occurring
in the early seventies.
286. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia established the Collegiate Football
Association, which provides its members with a television contract, thereby eliminat-
ing the NCAA's monopoly in televising college football).
287. See supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text; see, e.g., San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (USOC not a gov-
ernment actor under the fifth amendment when it sought to enjoin petitioner from us-
ing the word "Olympic" in promoting the "Gay Olympic Games," even though
congressional act gave USOC right to prohibit unauthorized use of the word
"Olympic").
288. The NCAA asked the Nevada Supreme Court to lift the injunction on May 11,
1989. L.A. Times, May 13, 1989, at C16, col. 1. Thereafter, Tarkanian asked the court
to uphold the twelve-year-old injunction. Id., May 22, 1989, at C7, col 1. The court sub-
sequently allowed Tarkanian to continue coaching at UNLV pending a hearing at the
Clark County District Court of Nevada to determine whether the United States
Supreme Court's decision effectively overturned the injunction. Washington Post,
Sept. 29, 1989, § 3, at 2, col. 2.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's ruling in Tarkanian reinforces the Court's reluctance
to find state action on behalf of a private party engaged in conduct
with an alleged state actor. Such a trend may keep plaintiffs with vi-
able constitutional claims out of the federal courts, thereby lessening
the courts' crowded dockets.
In its battle with Tarkanian, the NCAA received a boost for en-
forcing its method of regulating intercollegiate athletics. Perhaps the
problems that have plagued collegiate athletics for decades can be
rectified by the NCAA and its various committees and member insti-
tutions. The NCAA's victory over UNLV and Tarkanian may be the
first in the NCAA's long battle of improving the integrity of intercol-
legiate athletics.
Although Tarkanian lost his court battle against the NCAA, his
avoidance of a suspension for twelve years has given him the time to
create a highly successful program on the court at UNLV. A suspen-
sion back in 1977 may have scarred the UNLV program and hindered
its success. Thus, in a practical sense, Tarkanian may have ended up
a winner anyway, even though the NCAA finally defeated him at the
buzzer.
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